RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CRIMINAL LAW: SECOND CIRCUIT HOLDS CAUTIONARY
INSTRUCTIONS INSUFFICIENT TO CURE POTENTIAL
PREJUDICE RESULTING FROM ADMISSION OF
CO-CONSPIRATOR'S CONFESSION
United States v. Bozza' has seemingly departed from the heretofore
existing rule that a proper cautionary instruction in a multi-defendant trial can cure the prejudicial effect of one defendant's out-ofcourt confession on co-defendants. The appellants were convicted of
various crimes related to the burglary of several post offices and
the subsequent receipt and transportation of stolen stamps. The
prosecution's case was presented principally by an accomplice, A,
who was a major participant in each burglary. He testified that the
crimes were committed by various combinations of twelve persons,
six of whom were defendants in the instant case. To substantiate
A's testimony regarding the participation of one defendant, J, the
Government introduced into evidence J's post-arraignment confession, which was read to the jury with the word "blank" replacing the
name of each defendant except that of A and the declarant. The
jury was carefully instructed to assess the statement only against the
declarant and not to speculate how the confession might otherwise
be read to implicate any of the other co-defendants. Notwithstanding these "sufficiently clear" instructions,2 the Second Circuit, with
.one judge dissenting, reversed the convictions because it found that
the co-defendants were prejudicially affected by the admission of the
confession.
General rules of evidence, applied in both state and federal
courts, have been firmly settled regarding the admissibility of outof-court statements rendered by co-conspirators. Thus, assertions
made prior to the termination of the conspiracy may be used against
all the conspirators because the declarations are deemed part of the
common purpose for which they all share a collective responsibility.3
1 365 F 2d 206 (2d Cir. 1966).
2

1d. at 216.
E.g., Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 618 (1953); Fiswick v. United States,
329 U.S. 211, 217 (1946); see 4 WxGaoRE, EVIDENCE § 1079, at 127 (3d ed. 1940); 6
3
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On the other hand, declarations made after the completion of the
conspiratorial activity are admissible only against the declarant since
the collective responsibility ceased with the conspiracy's termination;4 such evidence is, therefore, equally excludable under conventional hearsay rules. 5 Yet, these post-conspiracy declarations
have generally been used in joint trials under the long-standing
theory that any possible prejudicial implication involving nondeclarant co-defendants could be overcome by clear cautionary instructions to the effect that the jury should consider such statements
only as evidence against the declarant. 6 In the leading case, Delli
Paoli v. United States,7 the Supreme Court delineated two tests in
order to determine whether non-declarants were afforded sufficient
protection against misuse of the confession: The trial court must be
satisfied, first, that the instructions were sufficiently clear, and,
second, that the jury could reasonably be expected to follow them. 8
In that case several "factors" favored admissibility of the confession:
(1) the conspiracy was simple and uncomplicated in character, (2)
the separate interests of the defendants were emphasized throughout
the trial, (3) introduction of the confession was postponed until the
final stage of the Government's case to allow the jury to consider it
it apart from other testimony, (4) the confession merely corroborated the Government's otherwise uncontradicted evidence, and
(5) nothing indicated that the jury had misunderstood or failed to
follow the court's instructions.9 The delineation of these factors has
afforded a useful standard of comparison for subsequent determinations of the proper application of the Delli Paoli formula. 10
id. § 1769, at 184; Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MicH. L. Rzv. 1159, 1163 (1954);
Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 671, 676 (1965).
'E.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 490 (1963); Rimmer v. United States,
172 F.2d 954, 959 (5th Cir. 1949); see 4 WmMORE, EVIDENCE § 1076, at 116 (3d ed.
1940); Navarro, Admission by Conspirator, 32 PHIL. L.J. 183, 184-85 (1957); Wessel,
ProceduralSafeguards for the Mass Conspiracy Trial, 48 A.B.A.J. 628 (1962); Annot.,
4 A.L.R.3d 671, 676 (1965).
r See authorities cited note 4 supra.
8E.g., Delli Paoli v. United States, 852 U.S. 232, 287-89 (1956); Lutwak v. United
States, 844 U.S. 604, 618 (1958). See generally 4 WiMoE, EVMENCE § 1076 (3d ed.
1940); Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 671, 714 (1965).
7 352 U.S. 282 (1956).
8 Id. at 239.
9Id. at 241-42.
10 E.g., United States v. Casalinuovo, 850 F.2d 207, 212 (2d Cir. 1965); United States
v. Castellana, 849 F.2d 264, 275 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 US. 928 (1966); United
States v. Caron, 266 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1959).
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Since this limited introduction of otherwise inadmissible declarations depends upon the assumption that jurors will follow the cautionary instructions of the court," the major criticism has questioned
12
the mental capacity of the jury to comply with those instructions,
to perform what Judge Learned Hand called "a mental gymnastic
which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody's else [sic].' 13
Concentration on this issue, however, conceals the underlying conflict among at least three significant policy considerations: first, the
administrative convenience and judicial economy of joint trials;
second, the evidentiary value of the confessions of less than all the
defendants; and third, the preservation of the co-defendants' right
to a fair and impartial trial.' 4 The limited admissibility rule has on
occasion been applied without, articulation of the considerations
which underlie its application.' 5 However, a reading of the principal
decisions suggests that the courts, even before the instant case, have
reached their ultimate decision after consideration of the foregoing
policy factors within the context of the circumstances of the particular case in an attempt to determine if the degree of prejudice is
sufficiently great to outweigh the salutary effects produced by the
admission of confessions. The opinions are not framed in terms
of whether any prejudice had been suffered by the non-declarants,
but whether on balance sufficient prejudice had been present to
deny defendants their rightful protection.' 6 In some instances the
admission of the confession has been upheld although the court
conceded that it was not possible to avoid all prejudice.17 Indeed,
Delli Paoli constructed the test to be "whether, under all the cir"'E.g., Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 242 (1956); Opper v. United
States, 848 U.S. 84, 95 (1954); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953); United
States v. Castellana, 349 F.2d 264, 275 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 928 (1966).

12 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949); Blumenthal v. United States,
332 U.S. 539, 559 (1947).
"Nash
1,

v. Untied States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932). See 365 F.2d at 215.

Compare Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d 863, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1964), with id. at

880 (dissenting opinion).
13 E.g., United States v. Reincke, 354 F.2d 418, 420-21 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 993 (1966); United States v. Miller, 340 F.2d 421, 423 (4th Cir. 1965).
26 See, e.g., Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 243 (1956); id. at 247 (dis-

senting opinion); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 618-19 (1953); United States
v. Gorman, 355 F.2d 151, 153 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1024 (1966); United
States v. Cianchetti, 315 F.2d 584, 590 (2d Cir. 1963); cf. United States v. Kelly, 349
F.2d 720, 758 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966).
17 United States v. Caron, 266 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1959); Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d
1006, 1006-07 (2d Cir. 1932).
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cumstances, the court's instructions to the jury provided petitioner
".18 Explicit in this approach to the
with sufficient protection ....
question of admissibility was that Court's admonition in the closing

paragraph of the opinion that "there may be practical limitations to
the circumstances"'9 under which limiting instructions will be effective.

United States v. Bozza purports to be within this exception to
the efficacy of limiting instructions. Accordingly, the opinion is
structured in terms of the criteria established in Delli Paoli. Although the court expressed no doubt over the adequacy or clarity of
the trial judge's instructions, it reversed the convictions by finding
that the case differed from Delli Paoli in several "significant respects." 20 First, Bozza involved circumstances which were "not so
simple"' 2' as the single conspiracy to sell unlicensed alcohol in Delli
Paoli, since here there were three conspiracy and seven substantive
counts for the jury to consider. Second, the confession "furnished
22
devastating corroboration of the heavily attacked testimony" of
the prosecution's chief witness, while in Delli Paoli the testimony
was "hardly critical" 23 to the Government's case. In addition, the
jury's request to see the declarant's confession, which was furnished
after the names had been blacked out, "created a real doubt, not
present in Delli Paoli, that at least some of [the jurors]

. ..

'failed to

follow the court's instructions.' "24 In considering these circumstances and the adequacy of the protection afforded by the instruction, the court concluded "that there is a point where credulity as
to the efficacy of such instructions ...is overstrained, and that point
25

was reached here."
By accepting' the majority's position that this case represents the
exception to the rule's application as anticipated by Delli Paoli,

Bozza could be lightly dismissed. However, a closer examination discloses a number of significant factors which inhibit such summary
disposition. Judge Moore, dissenting, cast considerable doubt on
each of the features in the case used by the majority to distinguish
18 352

U.S. at 239. (Emphasis added.)
19 352 U.S. at 243. (Emphasis added.)
20 365 F.2d at 216.
21 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
",Ibid.
23 Id. at 217.

See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
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Delli Paoli.26 While these objections may be valid, a more penetrating criticism would appear to result from an objective comparison of the actual protection afforded the defendants in the instant
case with that in Delli' Paoli and its progeny, which the majority
took pains to distinguish. 27 Such a comparison yields the surprising
result that the co-defendants were afforded more protection by the
trial court in Bozza than that received by the accused in any of the
other cases. Thus, unlike the procedure employed in the Delli
Paoli line of decisions, in the instant case the names of the nondeclarants were not read to the jury but rather were substituted with
the word "blank"; similarly, the names were blacked out before the
statement was given to the jury. These practices are exactly the
additional safeguards that the dissenters in Delli Paoli thought necessary to provide an accused with complete protection. 2
It might be suggested, therefore, that the instant case has departed from the Delli Pabli rule, perhaps in harmony with the
current trend of Supreme Court decisions centering on the rights
of the accused. 29 This explanation is too superficial, however, for
if one avoids focusing on the rhetorical distinctions made between
Delli Paoli and Bozza, the two cases can be understood as consistent
within the context of the three-factor balancing process previously
suggested. In joint trials the out-of-court confession of one defendant and the policy favoring the admission of such confessions act as
a catalyst to bring the policy of judicial economy into direct conflict
with the policy favoring protection of the rights of the accused. The
resolution of the conflict will only be possible through recourse to
the particular factual situation presented by each case, for each
factual situation will highlight one or more of the various policies.
Thus, for example, if a confession were crucial to the Government's case and strongly implicated a co-defendant, a severance of
the trial might be appropriate; on the other hand, if the confession
were of peripheral significance, the danger of prejudice would be
minimal, and considerations of efficient judicial administration
228-30.
United States v. Casalinuovo, 350 F.2d 207, 211-12 (2d Cir. 1965); United States
v. Castellana, 349 F.2d 264, 272-74 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 928 (1966);
United States v. Caron, 266 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1959).
28229 F.2d at 324 (Frank, J., dissenting); see 352 U.S. at 248 (dissenting opinion)
(agreement "in substance" with Frank, J.).
20 E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
26Id. at
2

(1964).
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would dictate admissibility and a joint trial. After all the factors
have been evaluated, instances will be found where one policy seems
dominant and the result is a trial severed, a confession held inadmissible, or a defendant considered unprejudiced. The seeming
inconsistency is only the inevitable result of the proper function of
the balancing process, since different factual contexts will demand
different decisions. Thus, United States v. Bozza is not to be lamented as summarily discarding a previous approach or as misreading Delli Paoli; rather, it is to be embraced as a proper expression of the analysis essential to a just and efficacious resolution of
the problems raised by the admission of implicatory confessions during the course of joint trials.

